Resource Based Constrained Delegation

In resource based Kerberos delegation, computers (resources) specify who they trust and who can delegate authentications to them. The attacks abuses this by writing to the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute that a user or computer that the attacker controls can impersonate and authenticate as any domain user to the computer.

So lets say that WEB01 trusts FAKE01 due to the modified AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity atribute. FAKE01 can impersonate any users that is trusted for delegation and can authenticate as Domain Admin to WEB01.

The attack can (as far as I know) be performed in three ways:

  • By abusing WRITE privileges on a computer object, it is possible to write to this attribute.

  • By triggering the target workstation to authenticate over webdav to the attacker machine and relay the hash to LDAP. Writing to this attribute. Forcing to authenticate can be done:

    • From a low-priv shell by abusing Change-LockScreen.

    • If the webclient is active with petitpotam or

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